Keywords: Taiwan presidential election 2024; Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); Kuomintang (KMT); Taiwan People’s Party (TPP); Opposition disunity; Coalition-building; Strategic voting; Multi-party democracies; Polling manipulation; Dual-polling proposal; Voter behavior; Fragmented opposition; Plurality victory; Two-round voting system; Electoral reforms; Strategic bias; Electoral fragmentation

Surveys conducted in 2023 for the January 2024 presidential election in Taiwan showed that 60% of voters opposed the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) remaining in power. However, opposition disunity enabled the DPP to win. The Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party, selected New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-ih through an internal vetting process, a decision met with resistance. Meanwhile, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a rising political entity, nominated its chairman, Dr. Ko Wen-je, the former Mayor of Taipei. Both the KMT and TPP insisted on their candidate leading the coalition. Despite efforts to unite, Hou and Ko ran separate campaigns, allowing the DPP to exploit the division. The DPP secured 40.05% of the vote, while the KMT and TPP garnered 33.49% and 26.46%, respectively.



As the election approached, widespread concern about the fragmented opposition led to a dual-polling proposal mediated by former President Ma Ying-jeou. This proposal compared Ko-Hou and Hou-Ko combinations against the DPP ticket of Lai Ching-te and Hsiao Bi-khim. In the process, Ko consented to a 3% polling margin, agreeing that for each polling data comparison, he would accept defeat unless his polling numbers were at least 3% higher than Hou's. However, the polls ended in a 3:3 tie after three surveys were invalidated due to technical issues. With no resolution, both candidates ran separately, splitting the opposition vote and securing a plurality victory for the DPP.



This study analyzes the opposition’s failure to unite, situating it within the broader framework of coalition-building and strategic voting in multi-party democracies. A critical inflection point was found at the candidate registration deadline. Before this deadline, Ko led Hou in head-to-head polls, reinforcing his belief that he could defeat the DPP’s candidate. Afterward, polling consistently showed Ko trailing both Lai and Hou. This discrepancy resulted from DPP supporters strategically inflating Ko’s pre-registration polling numbers to exaggerate his viability and discourage a joint ticket.



In the 2000 presidential election, the DPP won with 39.1% of the vote due to a KMT split. DPP supporters, recalling this outcome, sought to replicate it by fostering division between the KMT and TPP, ensuring another plurality victory. Polls failed to account for respondent affiliations, enabling this manipulation. Ko’s lack of awareness of strategic polling bias led him to misjudge his standing relative to Hou.



Taiwan’s lack of a two-round voting system, which consolidates opposition votes, further cemented the DPP’s win. The absence of such a mechanism magnified the impact of fragmentation, ensuring a plurality outcome. This case highlights the challenges of coalition-building in fragmented systems, the vulnerabilities of polling methodologies, and the need for electoral reforms to promote fairer representation. By addressing these dynamics, this study contributes to the understanding of electoral behavior and coalition strategies in multi-party contexts.