Keywords: Truce in Ukraine, Peace talks in Ukraine, Russia, Ukraine, War in Ukraine, Putin, Trump

Can we genuinely measure a society’s readiness for peace amid a long and traumatic war? Traditional public opinion surveys in Russia and Ukraine fall short - they capture snapshots, not the complexity of compromise. Our project “Truce” developed a new approach: scenario-based modeling of public acceptance of peace packages in Russia and Ukraine.
Instead of isolated questions, we presented respondents with holistic “packages” of peace conditions. Each scenario combined territorial control, NATO status, Western security guarantees, economic aid to Ukraine, and sanctions relief for Russia. Each respondent evaluated one complete scenario, reflecting realistic choices that negotiators might face.
The results are striking. We found that certain combinations of terms - especially those involving trade-offs - are acceptable to majorities on both sides. One consensus scenario, where Russia retains control over occupied territories (without Ukraine’s recognition), Ukraine receives Western security guarantees and recovery funding, and sanctions are gradually lifted from Russia, received support from 62% of Ukrainians and 60% of Russians.
The key insight, however, lies in the disconnect between society and political leadership. In Ukraine, public attitudes and government messaging align. In Russia, they diverge sharply: the Kremlin isn’t preparing the public for peace. Only 7% of the pro-government content in early 2025 expressed a neutral view of the truce negotiations. Peace is framed as defeat.
The Trump factor further complicated the dynamics. While his involvement briefly raised hopes — especially in Russia, where belief in an imminent end to the war doubled — it also increased polarisation. Among Ukrainians, Trump deepened mistrust: 72% believe he sides with Russia, and 84% do not trust him at all.
However, despite the American president’s pro-Russian stance, Russians' trust in him is also very low - only 28%, with 74% expressing distrust.
Our conclusion: Society is not the main obstacle. People in both countries are willing to compromise — as long as peace does not mean capitulation. The real obstacle is political will, particularly from the Russian leadership.
We dicovered that a realistic, mutually acceptable peace formula can be found. While governments may not guide their people toward peace, we - as researchers - can at least illuminate the path.